Karl Popper quotes

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Karl Raimund Popper. (1902 - 1994). Austrian-born British philosopher, psychologist, and social commentator.

We Do Not Know

“We do not know: we can only guess.”
  • Source: Popper, K. R. (2005). The Logic of Scientific Discovery | 1935 (1935/Epub). New York, NY: Routledge. Page 278.

Scientific Game

“Those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas to the hazard of refutation do not take part in the scientific game.”
  • Source: Popper, K. R. (2005). The Logic of Scientific Discovery | 1935 (1935/Epub). New York, NY: Routledge. Page 280.

Confirmation Easy

“It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations. Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions... A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it, or refute it.”
  • Source: Karl Raimund Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1963), 36.

Theory Personality

“Understanding a theory has, indeed, much in common with understanding a human personality. We may know or understand a man's system of dispositions pretty well; that is to say, we may be able to predict how he would act in a number of different situations. But since there are infinitely many possible situations, of infinite variety, a full understanding of a man's dispositions does not seem to be possible.”
  • Source: Karl Raimund Popper, Objective Knowledge: an Evolutionary Approach (1972), 299.

Rule of Rules

“It is the rule which says that the other rules of scientific procedure must be designed in such a way that they do not protect any statement in science against falsification.”
  • Source: Karl Raimund Popper (1959), The Logic of Scientific Discovery: Logik Der Forschung (2002), 33.

Method of Science

“The method of science depends on our attempts to describe the world with simple theories: theories that are complex may become untestable, even if they happen to be true. Science may be described as the art of systematic over-simplification — the art of discerning what we may with advantage omit.”
  • Source: Karl Raimund Popper, Karl Raimund Popper and William Warren Bartley (ed.), The Open Universe: an Argument for Indeterminism (1991), 44. by Karl Raimund Popper, William Warren Bartley - Science - 1991

Science Not Certain

“Science is not a system of certain, or established, statements; nor is it a system which steadily advances towards a state of finality... And our guesses are guided by the unscientific, the metaphysical (though biologically explicable) faith in laws, in regularities which we can uncover — discover. Like Bacon, we might describe our own contemporary science — 'the method of reasoning which men now ordinarily apply to nature' — as consisting of 'anticipations, rash and premature' and as 'prejudices'.”
  • Source: Karl Raimund Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), 278.

Irresponsible Dreams

“The history of science, like the history of all human ideas, is a history of irresponsible dreams, of obstinacy, and of error. But science is one of the very few human activities — perhaps the only one — in which errors are systematically criticized and fairly often, in time, corrected. This is why we can say that, in science, we often learn from our mistakes, and why we can speak clearly and sensibly about making progress there. In most other fields of human endeavour there is change, but rarely progress ... And in most fields we do not even know how to evaluate change.”
  • Source: Karl Raimund Popper, From Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1963), 216. Reproduced in Karl Popper, Truth, Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge (1979), 9.

Considerations

“These considerations led me in the winter of 1919-20 to conclusions which I may now reformulate as follows.
1. Confirmation is easy.
2. Only risky predictions should count.
3. A good theory is a prohibition.
4. A theory which is not refutable is not scientific.
5. A genuine test is an attempt to falsify a theory.
6. Confirming evidence should not count unless it attempted to falsify.
7. Some genuine testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their admirers.”

Explain Away

“Whenever the ‘classical’ system of the day is threatened by the results of new experiments which might be interpreted as falsifications according to my point of view, the system will appear unshaken to the conventionalist. He will explain away the inconsistencies which may have arisen; perhaps by blaming our inadequate mastery of the system.”
  • Source: Popper, K. R. (2005). The Logic of Scientific Discovery | 1935 (1935/Epub ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

No Conclusive Disproof

“No conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable.”
  • Source: Popper, K. R. (2005). The Logic of Scientific Discovery | 1935 (1935/Epub ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. Chap. 2

Soothsayer Trick

“It is a typical soothsayer's trick to predict things so vaguely that the predictions can hardly fail: that they become irrefutable.”

Strict Proof

“If you insist on strict proof (or strict disproof) in the empirical sciences, you will never benefit from experience, and never learn from it how wrong you are.”
  • Source: Popper, K. R. (2005). The Logic of Scientific Discovery | 1935 (1935/Epub ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Scientific Knowledge

“If the picture of the world which modern science draws comes anywhere near the truth — in other words, if we have anything like ‘scientific knowledge’ — then the conditions obtaining almost everywhere in the universe make the discovery of structural laws of the kind we are seeking — and thus the attainment of ‘scientific knowledge’ — almost impossible. For almost all regions of the universe are filled by chaotic radiation, and almost all the rest by matter in a likewise chaotic state. In spite of this, science has been miraculously successful in proceeding toward what I think should be regarded as its aim. This strange fact cannot, I think, be explained without proving too much. But it can encourage us to pursue that aim, even though we may not get any further encouragement to believe that we can actually attain it; neither from metaphysical realism nor from any other source.”
  • Source: Realism and the Aim of Science: From the Postscript to The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1983, p. 146, ISBN 0415084008

Epistemology

“In accordance with my proposal made above, epistemology, or the logic of scientific discovery, should be identified with the theory of scientific method. The theory of method, in so far as it goes beyond the purely logical analysis of the relations between scientific statements, is concerned with the choice of methods — with decisions about the way in which scientific statements are to be dealt with. These decisions will of course depend in their turn upon the aim which we choose from among a number of possible aims. The decision here proposed for laying down suitable rules for what I call the ‘empirical method’ is closely connected with my criterion of demarcation: I propose to adopt such rules as will ensure the testability of scientific statements; which is to say, their falsifiability.”
  • Source: Chapter 2. Popper, K. R. (2005). The Logic of Scientific Discovery | 1935 (1935/Epub ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.

Pseudo-Science

“Science is distinguished from pseudo-science - or from 'metaphysics' - by its empirical method, which is essentially inductive.”

Myths

“Science must begin with myths, and the criticism of myths.”
  • Source: Karl Popper (1957) The Philosophy of Science.